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A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets

Nöldeke, Georg and Samuelson, Larry. (1997) A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets. Journal of economic theory, Vol. 73, H. 1. pp. 118-156.

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Official URL: http://edoc.unibas.ch/dok/A5249187

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Abstract

In his work on signaling, Spence proposed a dynamic model of a market in which a buyer revises prices in light of experience and in which sellers, with private information about their types, choose utility-maximizing signals given these prices. We follow Spence's suggestion of introducing perturbations into the resulting dynamic process. In a broad class of markets, our model selects a separating equilibrium outcome if and only if the equilibrium outcome satisfies a version of the undefeated equilibrium concept, whereas a pooling equilibrium outcome is selected if and only if the equilibrium outcome is both undefeated and satisfiesD1.
Faculties and Departments:06 Faculty of Business and Economics > Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Professuren Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Mikroökonomische Theorie (Nöldeke)
UniBasel Contributors:Nöldeke, Georg
Item Type:Article, refereed
Article Subtype:Research Article
Publisher:Academic Press
ISSN:1095-7235
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Journal article
Last Modified:22 Mar 2012 14:28
Deposited On:22 Mar 2012 14:03

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