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Nash versus Schelling? The Importance of Constraints in Legislative Bargaining

Bailer, Stefanie and Schneider, Gerald. (2006) Nash versus Schelling? The Importance of Constraints in Legislative Bargaining. In: The European Union Decides. Cambridge, pp. 153-177.

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Official URL: http://edoc.unibas.ch/41569/

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Faculties and Departments:04 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > Departement Gesellschaftswissenschaften > Fachbereich Politikwissenschaft > Politikwissenschaft (Bailer)
UniBasel Contributors:Bailer, Stefanie
Item Type:Book Section
Book Section Subtype:Further Contribution in a Book
Publisher:Cambridge University Press
ISBN:978-0-521-86189-2
Series Name:Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Book item
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Last Modified:13 Dec 2017 15:28
Deposited On:12 Oct 2017 12:17

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