Lengwiler, Yvan and Rishabh, Kumar. (2017) Credit from the Monopoly Bank. WWZ Working Paper, 2017 (15).
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Official URL: http://edoc.unibas.ch/58451/
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Abstract
We establish that a monopoly bank never uses collateral as a screening device. A pooling equilibrium always exists in which all borrowers pay the same interest rate and put zero collateral. Absence of screening leads to socially inefficient lending in the sense that some socially productive firms are denied credit due to excessively high interest rate.
Faculties and Departments: | 06 Faculty of Business and Economics > Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Professuren Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Finanzmärkte (Lengwiler) |
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UniBasel Contributors: | Lengwiler, Yvan |
Item Type: | Working Paper |
Publisher: | WWZ Forum |
Number of Pages: | 28 |
Note: | Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Discussion paper / Internet publication |
Related URLs: | |
Identification Number: |
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Last Modified: | 31 Jan 2018 14:35 |
Deposited On: | 12 Jan 2018 14:15 |
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